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BOOK REVIEW 
SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POUTICS AND 
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 
By A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. 
Oxford University Press 1996 $30.00 
A Touchstone for the Legal Debate on Race for the 21st 
Century 
Reviewed by Jose Felipe Andersont 
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. has had a great impact in shaping 
the law of the United States for the last four decades as a judge, 
scholar, and advocate. l Although much of his contribution has been 
deciding issues in the mainstream of American life during his judi-
cial tenure, the heart of his contribution has been conspicuously. 
race conscious.2 Recently he has come to the attention of the 
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A., Uni-
versity of Maryland Baltimore County; J.D., University of Maryland School of 
Law. The author greatly acknowledges the contribution of Gabriel Terrasa for 
his assistance on this effort. 
1. Throughout this review I will use the title "Judge" when referring to the au-
thor who served for nearly thirty years on the Federal Bench: first on the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, ap-
pointed by President John F. Kennedy, and then on the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit from 1977 until his retirement. He became 
the Chief Judge of United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 
1989. Currently, Judge Higginbotham is a member of the faculty at Harvard 
University's Kennedy School of Government and serves as the school's first 
Public Service Professor of Jurisprudence. His other activities include serving 
of counsel to the New York law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garri-
son, and sitting on the Board of Directors for both the New York Times Com-
pany and the United States Civil Rights Commission. See generally Lincoln 
Caplan, Judging Leon Higginbotham: A Racial Conscience for America Is Back in the 
Ring 82 A.BA]. 70-72 (Sept. 1996). 
2. Even his earlier jurisprudence demonstrated an acute sensitivity to matters in-
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broader public by his personally directed public challenges offered 
to United States Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas 3 and 
Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich.4 
In his 1978 masterpiece, In the Matter of Color,5 Judge Higginbot-
ham provided a penetrating account of the race-based legal systems 
of several states during the colonial period. 6 That work was a de-
volving racial issues. For instance, in 1974 he issued an order enjoining a local 
union from intimidating blacks to drop discrimination suits against the union. 
Consequently, the union filed a motion to have Judge Higginbotham recuse 
himself from the case because of the union's allegation that he was racially bi-
ased. That request was rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit. See GILBERT WARE. FROM THE BLACK BAR: VOICES FOR EQUAL jus. 
TICE 255-61 (1976). 
3. In his famous "open letter" to Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, pub-
lished shortly after Justice Thomas was appointed to the Court, Judge Higgin-
botham offered advice to Justice Thomas about the importance of his appoint-
ment to Mrican Americans in light of the legacy of his predecessor, Justice 
Thurgood Marshall. In that writing, Judge Higginbotham recounted the his-
tory of the Mrican American legal struggle and cautioned Justice Thomas to 
remember the "fundamental problems of the disadvantaged, women, minori-
ties, and the powerless." A. Leon Higginbotham, An open Letter to Justice Clar-
ence Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1005, 1026 
(1992). 
4. In yet another "open letter," Judge Higginbotham expressed numerous con-
cerns regarding the Speaker Newt Gingrich's proposed "Contract with 
America," a group of legislative reforms believed by Judge Higginbotham to 
be harmful to minorities, the poor, and especially children. He wrote that 
"[t]he retrogression that your Contract has set loose will not only beat down 
the poor, it will, in time, engulf us all." A. Leon Higginbotham, Dear Mr. 
Speaker: An open Letter, NAT'L L. J. June 5, 1995, at A19. For a detailed discus-
sion of the proposal and rationale of the Contract with America, see NEWTON 
GINGRICH, To RENEW AMERICA (1995). 
5. A LEON HIGGINBOTHAM. JR.. IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE IN THE AMERICAN 
LEGAL PROCESS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978). The book has been cited by, fed-
eral and state courts on many occasions as a reliable source of legal history of 
events during the colonial period. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 
328-29 (1987) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, lJ., dissenting); 
United States v. Long, 935 F3d 1207, 1211 (1991); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 
393 A.2d 876, 880 (Pa. 1978). 
6. During the colonial period, the institution of slavery developed rapidly, creat-
ing a need for a system of rules to govern all of its circumstances. "As slavery 
rapidly entrenched itself in the plantation colonies during the early years of 
the eighteenth century, it forced the colonists to come to grips with novel 
problems which arose from the very nature of the institution." WINTHROP D. 
JORDAN. WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD TIlE NEGRO, 1550-
1812, at 103-04 (1977). Fashioning law for such a "peculiar institution" proved 
difficult; "representative assemblies in America and colonial officials in En-
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tailed examination of concrete legal problems created by oppres-
sive, race-conscious laws, particularly against the backdrop of slav-
ery.7 What differentiates In the Matter of Color frqm other historical 
works on race written during the 1960s8 is its succinct discussion of 
a legal system that was based on oppression of minority groups 
through the control of the law. It is Judge Higginbotham's status as 
a legal "insider," whose daily labors involve working with the sub-
stance of legal decisions, that sets his commentary on the legal sys-
tem apart from other knowledgeable observers. 
Judge Higginbotham's latest book, Shades of Freedom: Racial Polit-
ics and Presumptions of the American Legal Process (Shades of Freedom) is 
described by the author as the sequel to In the Matter of Color.9 
While not as expansive or detailed as the earlier work, it still retains 
the same high quality focus on concrete legal decisions as the back-
drop for diagnosing the problems presented by racism in the Amer-
ican legal system. Using concrete statistics and penetrating news ac-
counts, Shades of Freedom strikes at the core of the current racial 
debate with a literary tone that might suggest to some readers that 
its author intends to convey the notion that "the more things 
change, the more they stay the same."10 For those who are uncom-
gland were trying to stuff a new kind of property into old legal pigeonholes 
and were frequently unable to achieve a very good fit." Id. at 104. 
7. The history of the United States and conflicting public attitudes about slavery 
made conflict over the continuing validity of the institution almost inevitable. 
As Professor Derrick Bell explained, "By 1776, when the American Colonies 
were ready in the name of individual rights to rebel against English domina-
tion, slavery had been established for more than a century. The revolutionary 
period thus revealed an increase in the general ambivalence of the white ma-
jority as to the status of blacks." DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN 
LAw 26 (3rd ed. 1992). There was certainly obvious contradiction "between 
recognition of individual rights demanded by white Americans and the sup-
pression of those rights for blacks, free and slave, living in their midst." Id. 
8. During the peak of the civil rights movement of the 1960s, a number of out-
standing books on black history were published. See, e.g., LERONE BENNETI, JR 
BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER (1966); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SlAVERY TO FREE· 
DOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS (1967); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE 
OVER BlACK: ATIITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1966); BENJAMIN 
QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE MAKING OF AMERICA (1969) . 
. 9. See A LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR, SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRE-
SUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS viii-ix (1996) [hereinafter SHADES 
OF FREEDOM]. 
10. The question of whether America has made substantial progress toward 
achieving racial harmony has been the subject of much discussion. Recently, 
the debate has raged over whether efforts to achieve racial harmony and jus-
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fortable with candid, racial dialogue stated in direct terms, this 
book will be an unsettling read. Even from its opening passages, the 
author confronts the painful legal history of racism in America. He 
writes that, insofar as the law was concern.ed, "negroes were not dif-
ferentiated from 'sheep, horses, cattle or mares.' ''II 
The primary discussion in the book attempts to establish how 
the law has caused slow movement in racial progress because of 
what the author describes as "presumptions of racial inferiority."12 
Judge Higginbotham describes: "[The] dominant perspective within 
this volume is the role of the American legal process in sustaining, 
perpetuating and legitimizing the precepts of inferiority." 13 For 
those readers who desire to be intellectually challenged on contem-
porary racial issues, this fact-based chronicle of racism in the post-
colonial l4 legal system will provide a refreshing change from vague 
generalities about racial issues that have characterized other recent 
works on the subject. 15 
The book begins by listing six notorious examples of recent sit-
uations where Mrican Americans were wrongly accused of perpetrat-
ing heinous crimes. These examples were characterized by two in-
teresting features. First, these events came to the attention of most 
tice through integration have failed despite the legal evolution from slavery to 
legally mandated racial equality for Mrican Americans. See James S. Kunen, 
The End of Integration, TIME, April 29, 1996, at 38; see also Jose Felipe Anderson, 
Perspective on Missouri v. Jenkins: Abandoning the Unfinished Business of Public 
School Desegregation "With all Deliberate Speed," 39 How. L. J. 639 (1996) (discuss-
ing recent constitutional jurisprudence that makes creative attempts to deseg-
regate public schools almost impossible). 
11. SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 9, at xxiii. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at xxv. 
14. The focus of the book is primarily regarding the events following the Civil 
War. This was the period during which the law had to be reshaped after cen-
turies of slavery. 
15. Some recent books on the issue of race in America have taken different and 
sometimes controversial approaches to explaining the countries racial dispari-
ties. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLI-
GENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994) (attempting to explain, 
through quantitative methods, differences in intelligence testing results be-
tween racial groups); see also DINESH D'SouZA, THE END OF RACISM 551 (1995) 
(arguing that America's obsession with race is fueled by the civil rights estab-
lishment's vested interest in perpetuating black dependency, and suggesting 
that" [t]he solution to the race problem is a public policy strictly indifferent 
to race"). 
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Americans through the mass media. 16 Second, each involved white 
people accusing an anonymous and non-existent black person of 
committing the crime. 17 For most readers, these examples will have 
the effect of either making them receptive to the remainder of the 
author's message or eliciting a resistance to the message, perhaps 
causing some to close the book. Whatever reaction the opening ex-
amples prompt, one thing is certain: the recounting of those events 
jolts the reader to attention. 
Particularly noteworthy was the 1994 accusation of Susan Smith, 
who claimed that an "armed black man perpetrated a carjacking, 
kidnapped her children who were in the vehicle, and left her on 
the side of the road."18 It was later discovered, after weeks of net-
work news coverage regarding the abduction and the black man 
who was allegedly the culprit, that the story was a total fabrication. 
She was later arrested, tried, and convicted of the murder of her 
own children. 19 The jury that convicted her, however, spared her 
from the death penalty.20 
Another shocking example offered by Judge Higginbotham is 
the case of Charles Stuart, who claimed his pregnant wife had been 
assaulted in her vehicle and killed by a black man attempting to 
steal her cash and jewelry. Mrs. Stuart, who died from a gunshot 
wound to the abdomen, was in fact killed in an elaborate scheme 
devised by her husband and his brother.21 Judge Higginbotham rea-
sons that these examples of false accusation confirm "the centuries 
old precept of inferiority in American Slavery jurisprudence. "22 He 
further argues that the perception of inferiority that motivated 
these false accusations against blacks in the 1990s is not unrelated 
to the perception that legitimized slavery. 
16. African Americans have long complained that media coverage of events where 
they are involved is biased against them. Noted journalist Carl Rowan has writ-
ten that during the period immediately after World War II, .. [t]he white daily 
newspapers carried almost nothing about blacks except for an item about 
someone stealing a chicken or being accused of rape or robbery." CARL T. 
ROWAN, BREAKING BARRIERS, A MEMOIR 65 (1991). 
17. The perception that there is a lack of fairness for blacks in the criminal jus-
tice system has also been a pervasive problem. Even the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that racial discrimination "remains a fact of life, in the adminis-
tration of justice. " Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558-59 (1979). 
18. SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 9, at xxvi n.17. 
19. See Tom Morganthau, Condemned to Life, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1995, at 19. 
20. See id. 
21. See SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 9, at xxvi. 
22. [d. 
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Such a dramatic assertion of racial bias, of course, should be 
approached with caution and supported by more than a collection 
of newspaper accounts. Indeed, Judge Higginbotham provides 
more, beginning with a cogent statistical analysis quantifying the 
present inequality suffered by the African American community. He 
notes: 
In 1993, 28.9 percent of African-American households 
earned under $10,000 per year, while 12.2 percent of white 
households earned under $10,000 annually. Disparities are, 
perhaps, the most striking when we witness the plight of 
America's children. In 1989, almost half (46.1 percent) of 
all African American children lived in poverty, compared 
with 17.8 percent of white children. In 1993, in contrast, 1.9 
percent of African-American households earned over 
$100,000 annually, as did 6.3 percent of white households.23 
Judge Higginbotham's graphic introduction sets the foundation 
for the analytical framework he uses to examine the problem of 
race. He calls his principle theory "Ten precepts of American Slav-
ery Jurisprudence. "24 He asserts that these precepts "represent the 
institutional values, standards, or assumptions for which there was 
broad acceptance, at least on the part of those who wrote and inter-
preted the laws."25 Judge Higginbotham does not waiver on his posi-
23. Id. at xxix. 
24. See id. at 3. In a keynote address given in 1996, Judge Higginbotham ex-
plained that in developing his thesis, he attempted to "categorize a list of 
premises or precepts that, taken together, could explain the whole institution 
of colonial and antebellum slavery and directed how it should be adminis-
tered." A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Ten Precepts of American Slavery Jurispru-
dence: Chief Justice Roger Taney's Defense and Justice Thurgood MarshaU's Condemna-
tion of the Precept of Black Inferiority, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 1695, 1696 (1996). 
25. SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 9, at 5. The appendix of the book contains a 
summary of the ten precepts which he believes emerged from the institution 
of slavery: 
1. Inferiority: Presume, preserve, protect, and defend the ideal of 
the superiority of whites and the inferiority of blacks. 
2. Property: Define the slave as the master's property, maximize the 
master's financial interest, disregard the humanity of the slave ex-
cept when it serves the master's interest, and deny the slaves the 
fruit of their labor. 
3. Powerlessness: Keep blacks-whether slave or free-as powerless 
as possible so they will be submissive and dependent in every re-
spect, not only to the master but to whites in general. Limit 
blacks' accessibility to the courts and subject blacks to an inferior 
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tion that the precepts have a legal code-like quality. In fact, he em-
phasizes their pervasive yet unyielding influence on American legal 
doctrine. 
In discussing the "precept of inferiority," Judge Higginbotham 
reminds readers of the fateful words of Chief Justice Roger Brooke 
Taney's26 opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanjord,27 where he reasoned that 
system of justice with lesser rights and protection and greater 
punishments. Utilize violence and the powers of government to 
assure the submissiveness of blacks. 
4. Racial "Purity": Always preserve white male dominance. Draw an 
arbitrary racial line and preserve white racial purity as thus de-
fined. Tolerate sexual relations between white men and black wo-
men; punish severely relations between white women and non-
white men. As to children who are products of interracial sexual 
relations, the freedom of enslavement of the black child is deter-
mined by the status of the mother. 
5. Manumission and ,Free Blacks: Limit and discourage manumis-
sions; minimize the number of free blacks in the state. Confine 
free blacks to a status as close to slavery as possible. 
6. Family: Recognize no rights to black family, destroy the unity of 
the black family, deny slaves the right of marriage; demean and 
degrade black women, black men, black parents, and black chil-
dren; and condemn them for their conduct and state of mind. 
7. Education and Culture: Deny blacks any education, deny them 
knowledge of their culture, and make it a crime to teach those 
who are slaves how to read or write. 
8. Religion: Recognize no rights of slaves to define and practice 
their own religion, to choose their own religious leaders, or to 
worship with other blacks. Encourage them to adopt the religion 
of the white master, teach them that God who is white will re-
ward the slave who obeys the commands of his master here on 
earth. Use religion to justify the slave's status on earth. 
9. Liberty-Resistance: Limit blacks' opportunity to resist, bear arms, 
rebel, or flee; curtail their freedom of movement, freedom of as-
sociation, and freedom of expression. Deny blacks the right to 
vote and participate in government. 
10. By any means Possible: Support all measures, including the use 
of violence, that maximize the profitability of slavery and that le-
gitimize racism. Oppose by the use of violence if necessary, all 
measures that advocate the abolition of slavery or the diminution 
of white supremacy. 
Id. at 195-96. 
26. Chief Justice Roger Taney of the State of Maryland served as Chief Justice of 
the United States from 1836 to 1864. "Taney brought infamy upon himself be-
cause he viewed the alleged inferiority of blacks as a maxim of both law and 
the Constitution, a legal discrimination that he saw sanctioned even in the 
Declaration of Independence." THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME 
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blacks, "being of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate 
with the white race ... and so far inferior, that they had no rights 
which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro 
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his own 
benefit.' '28 
The Dred Scott opinion will be remembered as the legal decision 
which increased the tension that ultimately caused the Civil War. 29 
Consistent with Judge Higginbotham's notion that inferiority of the 
negro was assumed by the majority of society in Taney's time, the 
Dred Scott opinion further made clear that the perceived inferiority 
of the negro was a given. Taney explained that the assumed inferi-
ority of the negro at the time the country was founded was "fixed 
and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It was re-
garded as an axiom in morals as well as politics, which no one 
thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute."3o This 
view was unfortunately shared by other writers of the time,31 and it 
endured after the Civil War into the early 1900s.32 
Judge Higginbotham suggests that, as we enter the next millen-
nium, "it might be argued that the belief that Mrican Americans 
are of an 'inferior order' is an idea that some find difficult to aban-
don. ' '33 Although he recognizes that some people will challenge 
this precept, and many will find the suggestion that they harbor 
such feelings "downright insulting," he presses the point in order to 
attack the notion that the Civil War had a "cleansing effect on the 
sin of slavery. "34 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 859 (1992). 
27. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857). 
28. SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 9, at 7. 
29. Professor Derrick Bell points out that "the very excessiveness of the decision's 
language likely spurred those opposed to slavery to redouble their efforts to 
abolish [slavery]." BELL, supra note 7, at 25-26. 
30. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407. 
31. For an interesting collection of pro-slavery writings produced in the decades 
prior to the Civil War, see SLAVERY DEFENDED: THE VIEWS OF THE OLD SOUTH 
(1963). 
32. Mter the Civil War, attitudes about racial inferiority were sometimes presented 
as being supported by dubious scientific research. See HARVARD SITKOFF. A NEW 
DEAL FOR BLACKS: THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AS A NATIONAL ISSUE: THE 
DEPRESSION DECADE 5-6 (1978) (summarizing research at the tum of the cen-
tury that alleged black inferiority was a hereditary characteristic). 
33. SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 9, at 7. 
34. [d. at 29. 
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Further, he identifies what appears to be another goal of this 
provocative book-debunking the assumption held by most whites 
that there is no race problem at all. He concludes that the majority 
of White Americans believe "that they personally have nothing 
whatever to do with slavery, segregation or racial oppression be-
cause neither they nor-as far as they know-their ancestors ever 
enslaved anyone, ever burned a cross in the night in front of any-
one's house, or ever denied anyone a seat at the front of the bus."3s 
This "self absolving denial," he maintains, makes it "nearly impossi-
ble to have an honest discussion about what used to be called the 
'negro problem.' , '36 
It is also in the midst of his discussion of inferiority that he 
makes one of his most interesting points. Although he identifies the 
legal system as the primary culprit in the historical enforcement of 
the principles of inferiority, he notes that the legal system did not 
create the inferiority that it supportsY He comments that" [f]rom 
the time the Mricans first disembarked here in America, the colo-
nists [presumably without the benefit of any law] were prepared to 
regard them as inferior. "38 Thus, "when the law abolished state en-
forced racial segregation, it still did not eliminate the precept [of 
inferiority] .' '39 
What makes this point particularly interesting is that if the law 
did not create the precept, but merely assists in supporting it, then 
that may well explain why it is difficult to remove discrimination 
from our law by creating new or different laws. Thus, due to the 
precept of inferiority, the effects of dormant, or even unconscious, 
racism emerge through the application of law, but cannot be traced 
to the law itself. This may explain the many statistical,40 economic,41 
and educational42 disparities that are often attributed to racism by 
blacks and dismissed as mere coincidence by some whites. 43 Judge 
35. [d. at 7. 
36. [d. at 8. 
37. See id. at 9. 
38. [d. 
39. [d. 
40. Blacks have been overrepresented in the criminal justice system compared to 
their relative numbers in the population. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON & RICH-
ARD J. HERRNSTEIN. CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 461 (1985). 
41. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
42. See BELL supra note 7, at 611 (discussing the lower quality of education in 
predominantly black schools). 
43. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. 
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Higginbotham describes his precept of inferiority as having devel-
oped in four historical stages, which are divided over time following 
the post-colonial period. 
The first period, which spanned from 1619 to 1662, presumed 
inferiority without making it a formal part of the legal process. At 
this time, "the law did not succeed in articulating a clear rationale 
of, or in rigid enforcement for, the precept."44 In the second stage, 
lasting from 1662 to the 1830s, the legal process "carefully defined 
and, when necessary, ruthlessly enforced a precept which before 
then it had taken for granted."45 From the 1830s to the post-Civil 
War period, "the legal process defended and protected from attacks 
the crumbling institution of slavery."46 It was at this stage that the 
Supreme Court's disastrous decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford contrib-
uted to the outbreak of the Civil War.47 The final stage began at the 
reconstruction period48 and, according to Judge Higginbotham, "at-
tempted unsuccessfully to break free from the legacy of the precept 
of Black inferiority.' '49 He explains that it was at this stage "when 
the nation generally seemed unable or unwilling to totally erase the 
vestiges of slavery despite the significant constitutional 
amendments. "50 
In chapter three, discussing the first stage, which he calls "The 
Ancestry of Inferiority," Judge Higginbotham focuses on the origi-
nal status of Mrican Americans as indentured servants until their 
first sale in the Colony of Virginia in 1619.51 Here, he relates the re-
lationship between colonial religion and the precept of inferiority 
by pointing out that slave status sometimes depended on whether 
the negro had accepted Christianity. 52 
44. SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 9, at 15. 
45. [d. 
46. [d. 
47. See id. at 16. 
48. For an outstanding review of the reconstruction period, see ERIC FONER, RE-
CONSTRUCTION, AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REvOLUTION (1990). 
49. SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 9, at 16. 
50. [d. As one scholar has insightfully noted, "[t]he Civil War had been settled by 
force of anns, but the legitimacy of this Northern domination had not been 
resolved, even by 1954 .... [I]n 1877 when the northern occupying troops 
were withdrawn from southern soil the understanding [was] that the white 
South, would be free to impose subordinate status on blacks." ROBERT A 
BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 19 (1992). 
51. See SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 9, at 19. 
52. See id. at 18-24. 
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Judge Higginbotham describes the second stage in chapter 
three, calling it the "Ideology of Inferiority." It was in this period 
when the legislative process reinforced the precept of inferiority. 
This stage is characterized as the "most active"53 because legisla-
tures, "in far more rigorous fashion than did the courts, enact the 
fundamental components of the precept of black inferiority and 
erased all traces of ambivalence."54 Judge Higginbotham identifies a 
"shift from isolated judicial opinions to more comprehensive legisla-
tive enactments regarding the precept of black inferiority."55 This 
time period represented the season of the notorious slave codes. 
Judge Higginbotham points out, in gripping detail, their effect on 
the life of blacks: 
From 1705 until the end of legalized slavery in 1865, the 
slave statutes were compiled into codes that varied in their 
breadth and scope. The codes were both substantive and 
procedural. The substantive statutes defined the parameters 
of slavery, regulating the behavior of slaves and regulating 
the behavior of free people who interacted with slaves. Pro-
cedurally, they set up a separate judicial system for slaves, 
defined their punishment for various crimes, and turned 
them into a commodity in the economic system. No aspect 
of lives of slaves or free Mrican Americans was too sacred 
or mundane not to be regulated by the codes. From the 
time slaves were born until their death, the codes directly 
or indirectly regulated where they lived, and how they 
worked, what God they worshiped, to whom they were 
"married," with whom they had children and whether or 
not they were able to raise them, what sort of clothes they 
wore, and what kind of food they ate.56 
Some of these codes provided lenient punishment for masters 
who killed slaves, presuming that a master could not have intended 
to "destroy his own estate." 57 One 1705 Virginia law would have 
treated such a killing as an "accident" as if it had "never 
happened.' '58 
53. [d. at 29. 
54. [d. 
55. [d. at 29-30. 
56. [d. at 30. 
57. [d. 
58. [d. 
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Judge Higginbotham also discusses in detail the host of "black 
codes" that dictated that any percentage of black blood or the Mri-
can status of a child's mother would determine one's racial status 
and ability to obtain freedom from slavery under the law. 59 Such 
rules guaranteed that slaves would not gain their freedom by mar-
rying whites and prohibited whites from marrying "bond or free" 
blacks,60 thereby reinforcing the notion of inferiority. 
In his third stage, described in chapter five, which he calls the 
"Politics of Inferiority," he explains the evolution of the abolitionist 
movement and its effects on the ending of slavery. That movement, 
stimulated by the writings of James Otis,61 Harriet Beecher Stowe,62 
and Frederick Douglass,63 set the tone for the movement which 
would alter the course of the nation. 
Judge Higginbotham, however, criticizes some aspects of the ab-
olitionist movement for its sometimes patronizing assumptions that 
reinforced the precepts of inferiority. He explains: 
[A]bundant good intentions aside, the abolitionist view of 
Mrican Americans served to sustain the precept of inferi-
ority. . . . The fact of the matter is that Mrican Americans 
were no more saints than they were demons. . . . They de-
served to be free not because they were good and gentle, 
or because they were 'innocent,' but because they were 
human.64 
He observes that" [a]bolitionists' perception of Mrican Americans 
as saintly savages, however benign, was but a mirror image of the 
slaveholders' perception of Mrican Americans as demonic work-
horses. "65 He concludes this discussion by pointing out that despite 
erroneous perceptions by the abolitionists, many of them, "at great 
risk to their reputations and lives, mounted a relentless attack 
against slavery."66 
In this same chapter, Judge Higginbotham returns to his discus-
sion of Dred Scott v. Sanford and its implications for the post-Civil 
59. See ill. at 30-36. 
60. See ill. at 44. 
61. See id. at 53-54. 
62. See id. at 54-55. 
63. See id: at 55-59. 
64. Id. at 60. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
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War period.67 He describes the case as having codified into law, at 
the highest level of the American legal process, the precept of black 
inferiority.68 He focuses not only on Taney's sinister opinion, but 
also Abraham Lincoln's ideas about segregation. He reminds us of 
Lincoln's words that declared a "natural disgust in the minds of 
nearly all white people at the idea of indiscriminate amalgamation 
of the white and black races. "69 
Chapter six presents an explanation of the early constitutional 
writings which fueled the slavery debate when the Constitution was 
being formed. 70 He points out the obvious omission of the word 
"slavery" from the Constitution. The reason that" [t] he founding fa-
ther's refused to use the word 'slavery' in the Constitution of 1787 
reveals that they did not want to acknowledge to the world their 
legitimization of the precept of inferiority. "71 Judge Higginbotham 
explains that the founding fathers "were concerned that the docu-
ments would not blatantly reveal their sanctioning of an institution 
the morality of which was increasingly being questioned throughout 
the world.' '72 He notes that while the Constitution avoided direct 
references to slavery, provisions referring to it in other ways were in-
cluded in many other places in the document.73 
He notes that despite popular perception, the Emancipation 
Proclamation did not have the legal effect of completely eliminating 
slavery. It only freed "slaves within any State or part of a State 
where people were 'in rebellion against the United States."'74 In a 
later chapter, Judge Higginbotham examines the post-Civil War pe-
riod until the turn of the century when "Mrican Americans were 
killed, mutilated and oppressed for exercising their rights ... [and] 
[t]he courts wore blinders to the realities of the south."75 He cites 
the legislative hostility which led Congress to loosen its control of 
the South and dismantle reconstruction. 
He attributes a large part of the blame for this dismantling to a 
political deal during the presidential election of President Ruther-
67. See id. at 61-67. 
68. See id. at 67. 
69.Id. 
70. See id. at 69. 
71. Id. at 68. 
72.Id. 
73. Id. at 69. 
74. Id. at 73. 
75. Id. at 91. 
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ford B. Hayes.76 For example, state legislative hostility to the newly 
freed slaves is illustrated by the shocking statement by the chairman 
of the Kansas State Republican Committee, who said that the elec-
tion of Hayes would end federal intervention to protect slaves. The 
chairman commented, "[a]s matters look to me now, I think the 
policy of the new administration will be conciliate the white man of 
the South. Carpetbaggers to the rear, and niggers take care of 
yourselves. "77 
Chapter eight recounts the Supreme Court cases discussing 
public accommodations, with particular emphasis on the Civil Rights 
Cases of 1883.78 Chapter nine continues the public accommodations 
focus, discussing how the Court further legitimized inferiority in 
Plessy v. Ferguson, which, according to Judge Higginbotham, "was 
even more devastating than . . . Dred Scott. "79 This is because Plessy 
was decided "[a]fter the Constitution had declared with specificity 
that Mrican Americans were citizens of the United States."80 
Chapter ten moves from the public accommodations area to 
discussing housing discrimination following the turn of the century. 
He reviews the early technique of residential housing discrimina-
tion, which came to be known as the "Baltimore Idea."81 Under this 
plan, many major cities "authorized a comprehensive ghettoization 
program for their major urban areas."82 A 1911 Baltimore ordinance 
called for "preserving the peace, preventing conflict and ill feeling 
between white and colored races in Baltimore City, and promoting 
the general welfare of the city by providing for . . . separate blocks 
by black and white people for residences, churches and schools. "83 
Judge Higginbotham posits that the law was based on the notion 
that "Mrican Americans [are] inferior beings[,] ... not capable of 
taking care of property. "84 Because these laws were adopted for sev-
eral decades before such restrictions were held unconstitutional, it 
may well have been too late to reverse a permanent trend in hous-
ing segregation. "By 1948, when Shelley v. Kraemer established the il-
76. See id. at 93. 
77. Id. 
78. See id. at 94-107. 
79. Id. at 108. 
80. Id. 
81. See id. at 120. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 121; see also Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segrega-
tion Ordinances of 1910-1913,42 MD. L. REv. 289, 310 (1983). 
84. SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 9, at 122. 
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legality of restrictive covenants, the great 'black metropolises' of the 
United States had already been formed with the sanction of prior 
cases."85 
Judge Higginbotham spends a good deal of time discussing the 
forgotten history of segregation in the nation's courthouse hearing 
rooms, bathrooms, and cafeterias in chapter eleven. He also reveals 
the history of unsettling discriminatory remarks that have too often 
been used in America's courtrooms.86 He concludes that the segre-
gation in courthouses sent a powerful signal to all participants "that 
legitimated, reinforced, and perpetuated the segregation that was a 
way of life in the post-Plessy South and helped to justify the ideology 
of racism underlying its existence and enforcement. "87 
In the final two chapters, Judge Higginbotham examines voting 
rights in two contexts. The first is historical, discussing the civil 
rights jurisprudence of the Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes between 1930-1941 and what he describes as 
the Court's lack of "will" to address the South's pervasive and in-
creasingly sophisticated means of denying African Americans the 
right to vote.88 In the second, Judge Higginbotham discusses the 
problems presented by the precepts of inferiority in modern day 
elections. He states that the "[ d] enial of the right to participate ef-
fectively in the political process has been the most effective mecha-
nism to enforce the precept of inferiority."89 Judge Higginbotham 
strongly suggests that the greatest challenge following the denial of 
voter participation is the current trend of "racial polarization" that 
has occurred in recent political campaigns. Such campaigns have 
"fermented fear among white voters of candidates who may forward 
the interests of African American citizens."90 
The book has not been without its critics. Jeffery Rosen, writing 
in late 1996 for The New Republic, characterized its historical argu-
ments as "crude."91 Rosen maintains that Judge Higginbotham "is 
wrong to believe that the racism of the Reconstruction Republicans 
was formally enshrined in the American Constitution, as he is 
85. [d. at 125. 
86. See id. at 127-51. 
87. [d. at 132. 
88. See id. at 168. 
89. [d. at 169. 
90. [d. at 182. 
91. See Jeffery Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits: OJ Simpson, Critical Race Theory, 
American Law and the Triumph of Color Over Justice, THE NEW REpUBUC, Dec. 9, 
1996, at 27. 
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wrong to believe that 'most whites' in the reconstruction era were 
unwilling to live alongside Mrican Americans as equal citizens.' '92 
However, the history the book provides is the best retort to Ro-
sen's critique. If the Constitution had protected blacks, why has his-
tory demonstrated so strongly their need for legal protection? If 
whites were so willing to have blacks live side by side with them af-
ter reconstruction, why was the legislative and judicial movement 
advancing segregation so great?93 Clearly, the need to maintain Mri-
can Americans as an inferior class of citizens appears to be at least a 
plausible explanation. 
It seems to me that those who engage in meaningful debate 
over racial issues into the next century would better serve that de-
bate by examining the historical context of specific statutes and 
cases that have had a significant racial impact to determine if some 
common fundamental flaws in our legal or social system can be es-
tablished. Judge Higginbotham has succeeded in accomplishing this 
task. The examples of law and conduct that he cites are intended to 
force interested observers to directly confront our past, however 
"crude" that past might be. Perhaps we have yet to learn the most 
basic lessons of our past because we have not accepted the uncom-
fortable reality that many of the assumptions that nurtured a segre-
gated nation over a century ago still exist. 
The book, to be sure, is not intended to be a comprehensive 
explanation of how each "precept of inferiority" operates. 94 It is, 
however, an accurate account of how the desire to create inferiority, 
supported by custom, endorsed by law, and neglected by meaning-
ful reform, has brought the racial climate in this country to its cur-
rent sad state.95 Shades of Freedom provides a poignant chronicle of 
that past so that those who would ignore history and the stunning 
92. [d. 
93. Slow progress toward actual legal reform in desegregating housing by the 
Congress, the President, or the Supreme Court did not even occur until the 
1960s. See HOWARD ZINN, POST WAR AMERICA 1945-1971 (1973). 
94. Indeed, Judge Higginbotham explains that his book "is not intended to be an 
encyclopedia covering all racial legal incidents of the last few centuries-to do 
that would require many volumes[;] ... the more comprehensive details of 
the twentieth-century will be the grist for later volumes and other authors." 
SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 9, at ix. 
95. See Peter E. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive Anti-Poverty Strategy: Getting Beyond 
the Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. LJ. 1697, 1698 (1993) (reviewing statistics and circum-
stances demonstrating that racial minorities are still the overwhelming victims 
of crime, poverty, and drug abuse and arguing that those problems are 
"closely intertwined with issues of discrimination"). 
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impact of racial discrimination will be required to establish why race 
does not matter. 

